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 CSR DISCLOSURE: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE . . . ? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose – CSR disclosure is receiving increased attention from the mainstream accounting research 
community. In general, this recently published research has failed to engage significantly with prior CSR-
themed studies. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it examines whether more recent CSR 
reporting differs from that of the 1970s. Second,  it investigates whether one of the major findings of prior 
CSR research – that disclosure appears to be largely a function of exposure to legitimacy factors – 
continues to hold in more recent reporting. Third, it examines whether, as argued within the more recent 
CSR-themed studies, disclosure is valued by market participants. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Using Fortune 500 data from the late 1970s (from Ernst & Ernst, 1978) 
and a more recent sample (2010), we identify differences in CSR disclosure by computing adequate 
measures in terms of disclosure breadth and comparing them for any potential changes in the influence of 
legitimacy factors between 1977 and 2010. In the second stage of our analysis, we use a standard 
valuation model to compare the association between CSR and firm value between the two time periods. 
 
Findings – We first find that the breadth of CSR disclosure increased significantly, with respect to both 
environmental and social information provision. Second, we find that the relationship among legitimacy 
factors and CSR disclosure does not differ across our two time periods. However, our analysis focusing 
on environmental disclosure provides evidence that industry membership is less powerfully related to 
differences in reporting, but only for the weighted disclosure score. Finally, our results indicate that CSR 
disclosure, in apparent contrast to the arguments of the more recent mainstream investigations, is not 
positively valued by investors. 
 
Research limitations/implications – We explore changes in CSR disclosure only for industrial firms and 
as such we cannot generalize findings to companies in other industries.  Similarly, we focus only on 
companies in the United States while different relationships may hold in other countries. Further, our 
disclosure metrics are limited by the availability of firm-specific information provided by Ernst & Ernst. 
Limitations aside, however, our findings appear to suggest that the failure of the new wave of CSR 
research in the mainstream accounting community to acknowledge and consider prior research into social 
and environmental accounting is potentially troublesome. Specifically, recent CSR disclosure research 
published in mainstream journals often lends credence to voluntary disclosure arguments that ignore 
previous contradictory findings and well-established alternative explanations for observed empirical 
relationships. 
 
Practical implications – This paper provides supporting evidence that the unquestioned acceptance by 
the new wave of CSR researchers that the disclosure is about informing investors as opposed to being a 
tool of legitimation and image enhancement makes it less likely that such disclosure will ever move 
meaningfully toward transparent accountability. 
 
Originality/value – Our study suggests that CSR disclosure, while used more extensively today than 
three decades ago, may still largely be driven by concerns with corporate legitimacy, and still fails to 
provide information that is relevant for assessing firm value.  As such, the failure of the mainstream 
accounting community to acknowledge this possibility can only hinder the ultimate development of better 
accountability for all of the impacts of business. 
 
Keywords: CSR disclosure; disclosure changes; Ernst & Ernst; legitimacy theory; market valuation. 
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CSR DISCLOSURE: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE . . . ? 
 
 
Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure appears once again to be a topic of 
interest for mainstream accounting1 researchers (Patten, 2013). For example, The Accounting 
Review (TAR) recently published research on auditing of sustainability reports (Simnett et al., 
2009) and the impact of CSR reporting on firms’ cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). More 
recently, the journal included a forum on CSR research in accounting in its May 2012 issue.  In 
the introduction to that forum, current TAR editor John Harry Evans III states “the two forum 
archival studies document that shareholders have reason to care about CSR disclosures” and also 
adds that the third contribution to the forum, Moser and Martin (2012), suggests that 
experimental research could “offer new insight into understanding . . . why firms make the CSR 
disclosures that they do” (Evans, 2012, p. 721),2 Moser and Martin (2012, p. 798) also offer 
additional evidence of the renewed mainstream interest in CSR by noting the (at that time 
upcoming) conference on corporate accountability reporting hosted by the Harvard Business 
School in collaboration with Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE) held in January of 
2013. 
Our study is motivated by the Harvard/JAE conference’s call for papers,3 where one of 
the questions offered as a potential topic of interest was “How does corporate accountability 
reporting differ from corporate social responsibility of the 1970s . . .?”  What we find interesting 
                                                
1 For our purposes, ‘mainstream accounting’ research refers to work published in the three major North American 
academic accounting research journals, The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, and Journal of 
Accounting and Economics. 
2 We would argue that a large body of research, experimental and otherwise (see, e.g., Milne and Patten, 2002), 
already exists offering great insight into what drives firms to disclose CSR information. But given the oft-cited 
concerns with the quality of CSR disclosure in the social and environmental literature (e.g., Gray, 2006; Patten, 
2012), we question whether shareholders or any other stakeholders really have reason to care.	  	  	  
3 Accessed at www.hbs.edu/units/am/conferences/2013/corporate-accountability-reporting, July, 2012. 
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about this research question is that, in addition to its being left unanswered in the studies 
presented at the conference, a close reading of the articles and papers comprising the recent wave 
of mainstream interest in CSR suggests the authors are either unaware of, or unwilling to 
acknowledge, the body of research that investigates both the early CSR reporting and, more 
generally, corporate social and environmental disclosure over the past three decades.4  According 
to Patten (2013, p. 21) the real issue with the mainstream’s failure to engage with prior CSR-
themed research is that the earlier work “would appear to have substantial implications for the 
interpretations of the analyses included in the new wave of mainstream papers.”  While prior 
research suggests that much of the disclosure appears to be driven by concerns with legitimation 
and image enhancement (see, e.g., Deegan, 2002; 2007), the new wave seems only to focus on 
the assumption that the disclosure relates to informing investors.   
 In this paper, we examine whether more recent CSR reporting does indeed differ from 
that of the 1970s.  Importantly, we investigate whether one of the major findings of prior CSR 
research – that disclosure appears to be largely a function of exposure to legitimacy factors – 
continues to hold in more recent reporting, and secondly, whether, as argued within the more 
recent CSR-themed studies, disclosure is valued by market participants.  We do this by 
identifying differences in CSR disclosure in the late 1970s (using data from Ernst & Ernst, 1978) 
relative to disclosure from 2010 corporate reports.  More specifically, we show, first, that the 
breadth of CSR disclosure5 (using un-weighted and weighted measures of disclosure 
extensiveness) has grown dramatically, both with respect to environmental and social 
information provision.  Second, we also find that, for total CSR reporting, the relationship of 
                                                
4 For example, Moser and Martin (2012, p. 797), in a footnote, explicitly state that “there are many other earlier CSR 
studies published in The Accounting Review and in many other accounting journals” but they “do not cite such 
papers because this commentary is not intended to provide a review of prior CSR work […]”. 
5 We use the terms ‘breadth’ and extensiveness interchangeably, where the terms refer to the number of different 
categories of environmental and social information disclosed.  We discuss these categories in more detail below. 
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legitimacy factors (firm size and membership in environmentally sensitive industries) to 
differences in the breadth of disclosure does not differ across our two time periods.  However, 
our analysis focusing on only environmental disclosure provides evidence that industry 
membership is less powerfully related to differences in the reporting, but only for information 
weighted for the quality of disclosure.  We argue this decrease in association is likely due to the 
uptake of standalone CSR reporting over the past two decades.  Finally, and in contrast to the 
apparent beliefs of the new wave of mainstream researchers, we find no evidence that CSR 
disclosure is positively valued by investors.  In general, our results suggest that CSR disclosure, 
while more extensive today than it was three decades ago, may still largely be driven by 
concerns with corporate legitimacy, and still fails to provide information that is relevant for 
assessing firm value.    
 Ideally, we would hope that our findings would be relevant to those new mainstream 
researchers choosing to explore CSR issues.  Realistically, and based on the lack of engagement 
with the CSR research of the past three decades exhibited in the new wave of mainstream work, 
we think it is unlikely that the message will reach that audience.  However, our results are still 
important for those non-mainstream researchers who are aware of, and rely on, the prior CSR 
work, in that they validate the arguments of that literature and suggest that the claims of the new 
wave must be challenged.  We begin by providing background on CSR-themed research in 
accounting.   
Background 
While our study is motivated by the recent CSR activity by mainstream accounting 
researchers, it is important to note that CSR-themed explorations are not new to the mainstream 
journals.  Patten (2013) identifies that a number of papers related to CSR topics were published 
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over the 1970s and early 1980s in journals including The Accounting Review (e.g., Anderson and 
Frankle, 1980; Buzby and Falk, 1979; Ramanathan, 1976, Spicer, 1978) and the Journal of 
Accounting Research (e.g., Ingram, 1978; Ingram and Frazier, 1980).  He notes that while some 
of this early work consisted of papers exploring the expansion of the traditional role of 
accounting – including an attempt to establish a theoretical framework for corporate social 
reporting by Ramanathan (1976) – several empirical investigations appear to have been triggered 
by the changing social disclosure practices of U.S. corporations over the 1970s. For example, 
Ingram (1978), using Ernst & Ernst (E&E) disclosure survey data, calculated monthly returns for 
portfolios differentiated on categories of CSR information provided in annual reports and found 
only weak evidence of a market value for CSR disclosure. Anderson and Frankle (1980) 
compared portfolios of annual report disclosers and non-disclosers and found that the former 
exhibited more positive abnormal returns than the latter, but only in the month prior to report 
issuance. However, after the early 1980s, CSR research disappeared from mainstream journals 
for more than a decade, and when it re-emerged in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, the focus was 
exclusively on environmental information and its potential valuation in the market (see, e.g., 
Barth and McNichols, 1994; Hughes, 2000; Clarkson et al., 2004). 
 Although the mainstream journals were not publishing CSR-themed articles over the 
1980s and early 1990s, a substantial body of research on social and environmental disclosure 
was emerging through other outlets including Accounting, Organizations and Society, the 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, and Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal.  
As noted by Deegan (2002), a dominant theme of this research was the corporate use of the 
disclosure as a tool of legitimation.  Legitimacy theorists (e.g., Deegan, 2002; Lindblom, 1994; 
Patten, 1991) argue that companies facing social and political pressures may use disclosure in an 
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attempt to reduce these exposures, and numerous studies exploring disclosure over the 1970s 
through the 2000s document that legitimacy factors including firm size and membership in 
environmentally sensitive industries appear to explain differences in information provision.6  
Thus, a key argument emerging from this literature is that CSR disclosure appears to be more 
about image enhancement than meaningful accountability (see, e.g., Gray, 2006; Patten, 2012). 
Similar to the earlier works published in the mainstream journals, the new wave of CSR 
related research by the mainstream accounting community once again seems largely to be driven 
by changes in corporate reporting practices – in this case, the growth in the use of standalone 
CSR reports - and it includes a variety of topics related to broader CSR disclosure themes.  For 
example, Simnett et al. (2009) look at the impact of both country-level and firm specific factors 
on the choice to have CSR reports assured and, where assurance is obtained, the choice of 
assurance provider. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) investigate whether the initiation of stand-alone CSR 
reporting has an effect on disclosing firms’ cost of capital, while Dhaliwal et al. (2012) focus on 
a broad sample of international companies and attempt to determine whether the reports lead to 
increased analyst forecast accuracy.   Amongst the papers presented at the Harvard/JAE 
conference, Beatty and Liao (2013) focus on employee-related disclosure by geographic region, 
while Healy and Serafeim (2013) examine self-reported anticorruption efforts.   
Unfortunately, the newest wave of CSR research in the mainstream community fails to 
engage with, or even recognize, the substantial body of CSR research that precedes it.  Patten 
(2013) notes that, excepting Simnett et al. (2009), only two earlier CSR-related studies – Ingram 
and Frazier (1980) and Roberts (1992) – receive mention in any of the CSR-themed papers 
                                                
6 Certainly, other theoretical frameworks related to CSR disclosure emerged over this time.  For example, both 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory have been relied on in numerous studies of CSR disclosure.  As Deegan 
(2007) notes, there is considerable overlap between these theories and legitimacy theory, and exploring this overlap 
is beyond the scope of this investigation. 
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published recently in The Accounting Review or presented at the Harvard/JAE forum. The major 
problem with this omission is that the disclosure is being myopically viewed as a signaling 
device to market participants.  Dhaliwal et al. (2011, p. 62-63), for example, make the claim that 
“standalone CSR reports likely provide incrementally useful information for investors to 
evaluate firms’ long-term sustainability.”  Based on both the substantial body of evidence 
indicating CSR disclosure’s use as a legitimating tool and on the oft-cited (within the non-
mainstream literature) concerns with the quality of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure, we question whether shareholders, either in the 1970s or more recently, would have 
any reason to care about the information being provided.  Accordingly, in this study, we turn to 
the unanswered question from the Harvard/JAE call for papers and explore whether CSR 
disclosure today differs from that of the 1970s and, importantly, whether investors across either 
period appear to value the practice. 
Hypothesis Development 
 For several years over the 1970s, the accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst compiled a survey 
of corporate CSR disclosure included by the Fortune 500 industrial firms in their annual reports.  
Certainly, one of the most important findings of these surveys was that the extent of CSR 
disclosure appeared to be growing over time but varied dramatically across firms.  The last of the 
reports, Ernst & Ernst (1978) was based on disclosures in 1977 annual reports and contained 
detailed information on the areas of CSR disclosure for each of the surveyed companies.  We 
rely on this source for disclosure data in the late 1970s and as we discuss in the methods and 
results section below, we hand compile disclosure data for a similar sample of U.S. companies 
based on their 2010 annual reports, and where issued, stand-alone CSR reports.7  Our concern in 
this investigation is to identify differences in CSR disclosure across the two periods relative to 
                                                
7 Buhr (2007) notes that the practice of stand-alone CSR reporting by U.S. companies started in the early 1990s.   
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(1) the breadth of the disclosure, (2) the factors that explain differences in disclosure across 
firms, and (3) the relationships, if any, of the disclosure to firm valuation.  We separately provide 
our expectations for differences across these areas below. 
Has the breadth of CSR disclosure changed?  
 
 The first intent of our investigation is to identify whether the breadth of CSR disclosure 
differs in 2010 compared to 1977.  We believe there are several reasons for expecting the breadth 
of CSR disclosure to have increased.  First, and related to environmental information, the 1980s 
saw substantial changes in environmental regulation in the U.S. Of particular relevance are the 
passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Recovery Act of 
1980, better known as the Superfund legislation, and the adoption of the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act (SARA) six years later. The Superfund legislation addressed 
companies’ responsibilities for remediation of hazardous waste sites and ultimately led to 
recognition of significant environmental liabilities by affected firms (Cahan et al., 1997). And 
while SARA also had implications for hazardous waste-related liabilities, a major aspect of the 
law centered on the creation of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). As noted by Wolf (1996), 
TRI required, for the first time, manufacturing companies to report to the Environmental 
Protection Agency estimates of toxic chemicals released into the environment. 
Almost certainly as a result of the changing institutional environment, standard-setting 
bodies in the U.S. substantially increased the guidance and the requirements for financial report 
disclosure over the late 1980s and early 1990s.  For example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants all issued authoritative guidance related to recognition of 
environmental liabilities over this period, and prior studies (e.g., Barth et al., 1997; Patten, 
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2000;) document increased disclosure of these exposures.  Further, Cho and Patten (2008) 
indicate that a growing number of U.S. firms continued to adopt the reporting of environmental 
liability information over the mid-2000s.  Because Patten (2000) shows that increased disclosure 
of environmental exposure information is associated with increases in other, more positive pieces 
of environmental information, we expect environmental disclosure to be higher in 2010 than in 
1977. 
 In contrast to the environmental domain, the institutional environment with respect to 
other aspects of corporate social impacts remained relatively unchanged since the late 1970s. 
Almost all of the legislation related to employee health issues, product safety, and equal 
employment opportunity were already in place by the mid-1970s, and standard setting bodies in 
the U.S. issued no pronouncements or guidance with respect to disclosure of social-oriented 
issues. However, other factors may still have influenced corporate disclosure of social (as well as 
environmental) impact information, and we identify these factors in more detail below.   
One of the most important developments in driving our expectations for increased CSR 
disclosure is the creation of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the growth in stand-alone 
CSR reporting.   Established through a joint effort between the United Nations Environmental 
Program and the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies in the late-1990s, GRI 
offers guidelines for CSR disclosure across not only environmental, but also social dimensions.  
Ballou et al. (2006, p. 66) argue that the GRI guidelines are “the most dominant” in the world, 
and they claim that nearly 1,000 organizations world-wide were following GRI by 2006.  
Perhaps owing to the influence of GRI, considerable evidence indicates that the practice of CSR 
reporting through separate stand-alone reports has grown dramatically over the past decade.8 For 
                                                
8 Although not necessarily a function of the GRI, KPMG (2005) also indicates that the number of Global 250 
companies including CSR information in their annual reports was increasing over the early 2000s. 
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example, KPMG, in its 2011 survey of CSR disclosure, reports that 95 percent of the Global 250 
had issued some type of stand-alone CSR report over its period of investigation (KPMG, 2011). 
Other studies (e.g., Brown et al., 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Patten, 2012) note the practice is 
not limited to only the world’s largest companies.9  We anticipate that the growth of disclosure 
guidance and the proliferation of stand-alone CSR reporting will have led to increased 
extensiveness in the disclosure of CSR information across both the environmental and social 
areas. 
 A third factor that we argue increases the likelihood for increased CSR disclosure is the 
substantial increase in the social responsibility investment segment of the market.  Although, as 
pointed out by Haigh and Hazelton (2004), social responsibility investment funds date back to at 
least the early 1970s in the U.S., they did not become a substantial component of the overall 
investment market until relatively recently.  To illustrate, Social Investment Forum data indicate 
that social responsible investment assets grew from $639 billion in 1995 to just under $2.3 
trillion a decade later (Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Holder-Webb et al., 2009), Importantly, Dhaliwal et 
al. (2011, p. 62) argue that socially conscious investors are willing to pay a premium for socially 
responsible firms, thus increasing firms’ incentives to appear socially responsible.  One way 
firms can increase their appeal to this segment of the market is to project an image of social 
responsibility, and as such, we argue that the desire to tap into this market also will lead to 
increased CSR disclosure over time. 
 Finally, and perhaps related to the justifications noted above, we believe the 
establishment of organizations and agencies that evaluate and rank companies on their CSR 
performance also will have led to increased CSR disclosure.  Rating organizations such as 
                                                
9 For example, Patten (2012, p. 19) documents that, based on information from CorporateRegister.com, more than 
800 U.S. organizations have issued a stand-alone CSR-type report. 
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Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research and Analytics (KLD) attract considerable attention and 
publicity worldwide (Chatterji et al., 2009), They seek to make corporate social initiatives more 
transparent by analyzing companies’ plans and investments in the social and environmental 
domain, and as such rely, at least partly, on company-provided CSR disclosures.  Similarly, 
disclosure appears to play a role in company inclusion in socially responsible indexes such as the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index and the FTSE4Good (Cho, Guidry, Hageman, and Patten, 2012). 
Because CSR ratings and index membership can promote improved stakeholder relationships 
(Cooper and Owen, 2007) and lead to inclusion in social responsibility investment funds, firms 
seeking better ratings and increased likelihood of membership in the indexes have an incentive to 
increase their CSR disclosure. 
Based on the justifications laid out above, we state our first hypothesis in null form as: 
H1:  The breadth of corporate CSR disclosure will not differ across the 1977 and 2010 
periods. 
 
Given the substantial changes in environmental regulations over the 1980s in comparison to the 
lack of change regarding social legislation described above, we further refine this hypothesis 
across the environmental and social components of disclosure as follows: 
H1a:  The breadth of corporate environmental disclosure will not differ across the 1977 
and 2010 periods. 
H1b:  The breadth of corporate social disclosure will not differ across the 1977 and 2010 
periods. 
 
Have factors explaining differences in CSR disclosure across firms changed?  
 
 As noted by Patten (2002), the variation in CSR disclosure revealed by the Ernst & Ernst 
surveys (and other studies) led to a number of investigations attempting to explain the 
differences across firms.  And while a variety of theoretical lenses have been applied to these 
analyses (see, e.g., Gray et al., 1995), legitimacy theory is often recognized as the most dominant 
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(e.g., Deegan, 2002; 2007), Proponents of legitimacy theory argue that companies use CSR 
disclosure to address exposures in the social and political environment and as such, they posit a 
positive association between social exposure and the extent of CSR disclosure (Patten, 1991; 
1992; Hackston and Milne, 1996). Patten (2002, p. 765) notes that firm size and industry 
membership are the two factors most consistently shown to be related to differences in CSR 
disclosure, and we argue that empirical evidence suggests no changes in their association to CSR 
disclosure over time.  Cowen et al. (1987) used disclosure data from Ernst & Ernst (1978) and 
reported firm size and membership in various environmentally sensitive industries as the factors 
most consistently explaining differences in the disclosure.  Similar associations have since been 
reported for CSR disclosures by U.S. companies in the 1980s (Patten, 1991), the 1990s (Gamble 
et al., 1995; Patten, 2002), and the 2000s (Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Cho, Freedman, and Patten, 
2012). Given the consistent findings over time, we expect the relationship of legitimacy variables 
to differences in CSR disclosure to remain unchanged from 1977 to 2010.  We state this 
hypothesis in null form as: 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, the relationship between organizational legitimacy and the breadth 
of CSR disclosure will not have changed from 1977 to 2010.  
 
Has the relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value changed? 
 
 The third purpose of our study is to investigate for any change in the degree to which 
CSR information appears to be valued in the marketplace.  In contrast to examinations of the 
extent of CSR disclosure and the factors that explain differences in it, explorations of the market 
value of CSR disclosure are more limited and do not provide a consistent signal regarding 
potential impacts.  Several early studies investigated the market reaction to annual report CSR 
disclosure and relied on information compiled by Ernst & Ernst in its annual surveys of CSR 
disclosure (e.g., Ernst & Ernst, 1978) to identify sample companies and their choice to disclose.  
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Belkaoui (1976), for example, used a monthly return model and tested for differences in market 
reaction at the time of issuance of annual reports for a sample of 50 firms identified by Ernst & 
Ernst as having pollution control disclosures versus a control group of non-disclosing companies.  
Belkaoui reports more positive returns for the disclosing firms.  Ingram (1978), based on a larger 
sample and noting differences in disclosure across both social and environmental areas, finds no 
significant market reaction for his sample of disclosing companies overall.  However, controlling 
for the sign of unexpected earnings and partitioning across industry subsets, Ingram does report 
some limited positive market reactions associated with aspects of CSR disclosure.  Finally, 
Anderson and Frankle (1980) control for differences in firm-specific market risk and also 
examine for market reactions at the time of annual report issuance.  Using a broad sample drawn 
from the Ernst & Ernst surveys, they report significant positive market reactions for CSR 
disclosing companies vis-à-vis non-disclosing counterparts, but primarily only for the month 
preceding annual report releases.  Part of the problem with these early market studies of CSR 
disclosure is that, because the focus was on annual report disclosure of the information, results 
were likely confounded by other information.10  In contrast, a more recent investigation of the 
market effects of CSR reporting (Guidry and Patten, 2010) examines reactions at the time of 
press releases announcing the first-time issuance of stand-alone CSR reports (where firms with 
confounding information announcements were excluded), Guidry and Patten (2010) report 
positive market reactions over a three-day event period centered on the press release date, but 
only for firms with more extensive disclosure. 
 Focusing more specifically on differences in firm valuation (as opposed to one-time 
market effects), two recent non-U.S. studies, Murray et al. (2006) and Jones et al. (2007), 
examine whether differences in social and environmental disclosure have long-term effects.  
                                                
10 Of course, the use of monthly returns also introduces problems with respect to confounding events. 
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Murray et al. (2006) report no significant short-term associations between CSR disclosure and 
market valuation for a sample of U.K. firms, but they do find that over a nine-year period of 
time, higher levels of disclosure appear to correlate with higher market valuation.  In contrast, 
Jones et al. (2007), relying on a sample of Australian companies, find that CSR disclosure 
appears to be negatively, but only weakly associated with longer-term market valuation effects. 
 Although not focusing on CSR disclosure, several recent studies of environmental 
performance also provide potential justification for expectations that CSR information might be 
reflected in firm value.  Hughes (2000, p. 210) claims that costs likely to be incurred in the future 
to address environmental performance issues often fail to meet the FASB Statement No. 5 
requirements that they be “reasonably estimable.” As such, he argues, they are usually not 
recognized in the financial statements.  However, because these costs can be substantial, they 
could be expected to impact firm value.  Relying on models controlling for the impacts of the 
book value of assets and liabilities, these studies examine whether differences in the market 
value of equity are related to future environmental cost exposures.   Within this area, Barth and 
McNichols (1994), show that publicly available information on companies’ exposures to 
investigations under the Superfund legislation are reflected as value-relevant unrecognized 
liabilities for affected firms.  Similarly, Hughes (2000) finds that differences in sulfur dioxide 
emissions as reported by the Department of Energy for publicly traded utility companies targeted 
for reduction goals under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) are associated with 
differences in the market value of those firms.  Finally, Clarkson et al. (2004) use two different 
measures of corporate environmental performance compiled by the EPA to partition their sample 
of pulp and paper companies into high-polluting and low-polluting sub-samples, and, consistent 
 14 
with both Barth and McNichols (1994) and Hughes (2000), their results indicate the market 
assesses a statistically significant unbooked liability for the high polluting firms.   
 In general, Barth and McNichols (1994), Hughes (2000), and Clarkson et al. (2004) all 
present evidence suggesting the market captures at least environmental performance information 
made available through non-company sources.  If CSR disclosures provide meaningful 
information allowing investors to infer social and environmental performance (see, e.g., 
Dhaliwal et al., 2012), we would expect more extensive information provision to be associated 
with differences in firm value.  Further, to the extent that we find expanded disclosure in our 
later period, we would also anticipate differences in disclosure in 2010 to be more closely 
associated with differences in firm value than for the 1977 period.  However, CSR disclosure has 
been widely criticized as not providing meaningful information.  Gray (2006, p. 803), for 
example, argues that “the vast majority of corporate reporting practice is . . . voluntary, partial, 
and, mostly, fairly trivial,” and “with such data, no reader could make any kind of reliable 
estimate of the organisation’s social or environmental performance.”  Thus, it is not clear that 
CSR disclosure should be expected to relate to firm value. 
 Based on the mixed evidence cited above, we offer our hypotheses related to CSR 
disclosure and firm value in null form.  We state these as: 
H3:  Ceteris paribus, differences in CSR disclosure are not related to differences in firm 
value. 
H4:  Ceteris paribus, the relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value will not 
differ across the 1977 and 2010 periods. 
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Methods and Results 
 
Sample Identification 
 
 Two major issues influence sample selection.  First, while the Fortune 500 on which the 
1978 E&E survey was based included only industrial firms, more recent Fortune 500 listings 
include other types of companies including financial services firms, utilities, transportation 
companies, and retailers.  Numerous studies indicate that CSR disclosure differs across industry 
sectors, and accordingly, to assure comparability, we focus our 2010 analysis only on industrial 
companies from sectors similar to those used by E&E for its 1978 survey.11  As such, 280 of the 
Fortune 500 companies from 2010 were eliminated due to industry sector.  Moreover, we also 
consider potential comparability issues driven by the size of the companies since numerous 
studies indicate firm size influences CSR disclosure. We thus focus only on the 250 largest 
companies included in the 1977 Fortune 500 industrials, two of which were not included in the 
E&E analysis. The second major factor influencing sample selection was the availability of 
financial data through the WRDS database.  In total, seven firms from 2010 and 43 companies 
from 1978 either were not available in the database or had missing data.  As such our final 
sample consists of 213 industrial firms from 2010 and 205 from 1977.  Only 71 companies are 
included in both years. 
CSR Disclosure Measures 
 
We identify CSR disclosure breadth in 1977 using data reported in E&E (1978). For each 
firm, the survey identifies the disclosure of 25 different items of environmental and social 
information across six categories– environment, energy, fair business practices, human 
resources, community involvement, and product (see Appendix). We use the same metric to 
                                                
11 The Fortune 500 from 1977 also included Broadcasting, Motion Picture Production and Distribution firms.  We do 
the same. 
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classify the breadth of disclosure included in the 2010 reports. We award one point for each of 
the 25 items disclosed by the sample firms, and as such content scores could range from zero to 
25.  We then decompose the scores into separate measures for environmental disclosure (the 
environment and energy categories) consisting of seven information items, and social disclosure 
(using the remaining four classifications) including 18 potential disclosure items. 
 We further employ a second CSR disclosure measure that takes into consideration the 
specificity of the information provided. Similar to Wiseman (1982), we weight monetary 
disclosures as a three, quantitative but non-monetary disclosures are scored as a two, and non-
quantitative disclosures receive only one point.  However, E&E (1978) only break down the 
monetary/quantitative disclosure across the six major categories of information (i.e., rather than 
indicating the level of specificity for each of the 25 disclosure items, E&E only indicate, for 
example, that disclosures in the environmental category included monetary or quantitative non-
monetary information). As such, the overall weighted disclosure scores could range from zero to 
18 (up to 3 points for each of the six disclosure categories), the weighted environmental scores 
from zero to six, and the weighted social scores from zero to 12. 
Differences in Disclosure Breadth 
 
 We use a t-test of differences in means to assess the significance of changes in CSR 
disclosure over time.  As summarized in Panel A of Table 1, the breadth of overall CSR 
disclosure is significantly higher in 2010 than it had been in 1977, and thus Hypothesis 1 is 
rejected.  The average content score in 1978 was 6.99 in comparison to a mean score of 14.54 for 
the 2010 sample.  Similarly, the weighted disclosure scores rose from an average of 6.13 in 1977 
to 11.98 by 2010.  Both sets of differences are statistically significant at p < .001, two-tailed.12  
Panels B and C of Table 1 identify the mean disclosure scores for the environmental and social 
                                                
12 Results are qualitatively similar for a sub-set of only those firms included in both sample years. 
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disclosure sub-components, respectively, and results indicate that all disclosure measures are 
significantly higher in 2010 than they had been in 1977.  Thus, the overall change in disclosure is 
not driven by changes in only one of the areas. Certainly, a key factor in the growth of disclosure 
breadth is the adoption of standalone CSR reporting.  In 2010, 122 of our sample companies 
issued such a report.  However, it is important to note that, for the 92 firms without such reports, 
CSR disclosure across all six metrics, while considerably less extensive than for their report-
issuing counterparts,13 also was significantly higher (at p < .05, two-tailed) than for the 1977 
sample. 
---------- Table 1 about here ---------- 
 
Legitimacy Factors 
 
 We next attempt to assess whether the influence of legitimacy factors has changed over 
time, and as such, we pool the data from 1977 and 2010.  To control for the differences in 
disclosure across the periods noted above, we include a year indicator variable (Year) where one 
designates observations from 2010.  We measure firm size as the relative rank of the company 
within the sample for its year based on total revenues, and as such, we expect a negative 
association between this variable (SizeRank) and the breadth of CSR disclosure (lower rank 
designates a larger company and we anticipate breadth of disclosure will be higher for larger 
firms). Consistent with prior research (e.g., Patten, 2002; Cho et al., 2012), we designate 
companies from environmentally sensitive industries (ESI) using a one/zero indicator variable, 
where the extractive, paper, chemicals, petroleum and metals industries are classified as ESI. 
Overall, 77 (66) of the sample observations from 1977 (2010) were classified as ESI.  We 
anticipate a positive association between our ESI variable and CSR disclosure. To identify any 
                                                
13 To illustrate, the mean un-weighted and weighted total disclosure scores for the 92 companies without standalone 
CSR reports were 8.64 and 8.62, respectively. 
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changes in the impact of the legitimacy variables, we include year/variable interaction terms.  
Given our expectation that legitimacy factors will continue to be associated with differences in 
CSR disclosure, we expect the coefficients on the interaction variables (Year*SizeRank, 
Year*ESI) to be statistically insignificant.  We state our legitimacy model (with the expected 
sign of association beneath each variable) as: 
  DISCi = a1 + B1Yeari + B2SizeRanki + B3ESIi + B4Year*SizeRanki + B5Year*ESIi  + ei 
         (+)   (-)         (+)      (+/-)              (+/-)  
 
Finally, we estimate our regression models, first, for each of the total disclosure breadth 
measures, and then separately for the environmental and social sub-component scores. 
 As reported in Table 2, the SizeRank variable is negative and statistically significant (at p 
< .01, one-tailed) for both disclosure models.  However, while positively signed in both cases, 
the ESI variable is only statistically significant (at p < .01, one-tailed) relative to the weighted 
disclosure score.  Importantly, neither of the interaction terms is statistically significant for either 
of the disclosure models.  This indicates that the basic relationships between the legitimacy 
factors and the breadth of CSR disclosure remain similar across the two time periods.  The 
results thus support Hypothesis 2. 
---------- Table 2 about here ---------- 
 
 Table 3 presents results for the additional legitimacy regressions on the disclosure sub-
components.  With respect to the environmental disclosures, we find both firm size and ESI are 
significantly related (at p = .001, two-tailed) to environmental disclosure scores using either 
metric.  Interestingly, however, the Year*ESI interaction variable is negative and significant in 
the weighted scores model, indicating that ESI membership explains less variation in weighted 
environmental disclosure in 2010 than it had in 1977.  In contrast, while firm size continues to be 
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positively related to differences in social disclosure (using either disclosure measure), we find 
that ESI membership is not related to social information provision.14 
 One potential explanation for the decreased association between ESI and weighted 
environmental disclosure is the uptake of standalone CSR reporting by companies across 
virtually all industry sectors over the past two decades (see, e.g., KPMG, 2011),  Patten and Zhao 
(2014) argue that because many of the reporting companies rely on guidelines from the GRI that 
include considerable emphasis on the disclosure of environmental information, even firms from 
non-environmentally sensitive industries are including substantial amounts of environmental 
disclosure in their reports.  They find, for example, that U.S. retail companies (an industry not 
considered environmentally sensitive) allocated more space in their first-time CSR reports, on 
average, to environmental disclosures than to any other category of social information. The 
increased levels of disclosure by non-ESI companies would thus explain why ESI membership is 
less powerful in the later period of our analysis.15 
---------- Table 3 about here ---------- 
CSR and Firm Value 
 
 Our final set of tests focuses on the relationship between CSR disclosure and differences 
in firm value.  We rely on the basic market valuation model employed by Barth and McNichols 
(1994), although, similar to Aboody et al. (2004) we also control for firms’ earnings.  As with 
the legitimacy tests, we pool observations across the 1977 and 2010 periods.  Because a t-test of 
means showed the average market value of equity was significantly larger in 2010 than it had 
                                                
14 In non-tabulated sensitivity tests, we re-estimated the legitimacy models for the social disclosure items replacing 
ESI with a ‘socially exposed industry’ classification variable.  Following Brammer and Millington (2005) and Cho 
et al. (2012), we classified firms from the extractive, chemical, paper, pharmaceutical, alcoholic beverages, and 
defense industries as facing greater social exposures.  Results of these analyses were qualitatively similar to those 
using the ESI variable.   
15 In support of this argument, regressions deleting the 122 companies from 2010 with standalone reports show that 
the ESI interaction term is no longer significant for either the un-weighted or weighted environmental disclosure 
scores. 
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been in 1977 we add a one/zero indicator variable (Year) where one indicates observations from 
2010 to control for these differences.  We also add a Year*Disclosure interaction variable to 
capture any differences in the impact of CSR disclosure on firm value over the two sample 
periods.16  We thus state our valuation model (with the expected sign of association beneath each 
variable) as: 
     MVEi = a1 + B1Yeari + B2Total Assetsi + B3Total Liabilitiesi + B4EBITi  + B5Disclosurei   
          (+)      (+)            (-)     (+)           (+/-) 
    
  + B6Year*Disclosurei + ei 
   (+/-)          
 
All financial variables are measured as of the end of the fiscal year and all are deflated by the 
number of shares outstanding.  Similar to the legitimacy analysis, we estimated models first 
using total CSR disclosure metrics and then ran separate analyses using the disclosure sub-
components. 
 Table 4 reports the results of our market value tests using the total CSR disclosure scores.  
We find no evidence that total CSR disclosure (using either disclosure metric) is associated with 
firm value.  In each of the models, the Disclosure variable is negatively signed and is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  Further, the interaction term (Year*Disclosure) is 
also statistically insignificant, indicating the relationship between total CSR disclosure and 
market value does not differ across our two time periods.  As reported in Table 5, the results of 
the market valuation tests using the social disclosure scores are similar to those for total CSR 
disclosure.  Neither disclosure nor the interaction term is statistically significant for models using 
either of the social disclosure scores.  However, as also presented in Table 5, we find, first, that 
                                                
16 In non-tabulated sensitivity tests, we also allow the impact of the financial explanatory variables to vary across the 
two periods.  Results indicated our earnings measure is more positively associated with differences in firm value in 
2010 than it had been in 1977, whereas the interaction terms on the other financial variables are statistically 
insignificant.  Inferences for the CSR disclosure variables remain unchanged in this additional analysis. 
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environmental disclosure using either metric is significantly, but negatively related to differences 
in firm value.  Results also indicate a positive and significant interaction between disclosure and 
year for the un-weighted environmental score model suggesting that the negative impact of 
environmental disclosure on market value is reduced in the 2010 period. The interaction term in 
the weighted environmental disclosure model is also positively signed, but is not significant at 
conventional levels. 
---------- Tables 4 and 5 about here ---------- 
 The negative association between environmental disclosure and market value suggests 
that the market negatively values this information provision.  However, a potential explanation 
for this finding is that our model does not control for the environmental performance of sample 
companies.  Numerous studies over the past decade (e.g., Aerts and Cormier, 2009; Cho and 
Patten, 2007; Cho et al., 2012) document a negative relationship between corporate 
environmental disclosure and firms’ environmental performance.  That is, companies with worse 
environmental performance make more extensive environmental disclosures, presumably in an 
attempt to reduce the exposures arising from their environmental impacts (Patten, 2002). 
Because prior studies show that investors negatively value at least some aspects of the 
environmental performance (Barth and McNichols, 1994; Clarkson et al., 2004), the negative 
association between our disclosure measure and sample firms’ market value could be due to the 
metric proxying for performance relationships.  Ideally, therefore, we would like to control for 
environmental performance impacts.  Unfortunately, we are aware of no publicly available 
assessments of corporate environmental performance from the 1970s.  In an attempt to shed light 
on this possible explanation, therefore, we focus only on the 2010 sample and incorporate 
environmental performance assessments from the firm KLD Analytics.  KLD performance data 
 22 
have been used in a number of prior studies (e.g., Cho and Patten, 2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2011) 
and the evaluations consist of assessments of performance across various strength and concern 
categories.  However, due to Chatterji et al.’s (2009) findings that the strength scores are not 
related to other measures of environmental performance, we rely on only the concern scores as 
our measure of environmental performance.  Because several of the sample companies were not 
included in the KLD database, this stage of our analysis includes 196 companies. 
 Calculation of Pearson Product-Moment correlations indicates that the KLD concern 
scores for our 2010 sample17 are positively and significantly (at p = .001, two-tailed) associated 
with the environmental disclosure measures.  Because higher concerns indicate worse 
performance, this suggests, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Cho and Patten, 2007), that worse 
performing companies include more extensive environmental disclosure.  Table 6 presents the 
results of the market valuation tests on environmental disclosure controlling for environmental 
performance.  As reported in the table, neither the un-weighted nor the weighted disclosure 
measure is statistically significant at conventional levels.  We also find that the environmental 
performance measure is not significantly associated with differences in market value for our 
2010 sample of firms.18 In additional sensitivity tests, we estimated models with interaction 
terms to allow the impact of disclosure to vary across better and worse performers, as well as 
models controlling for ESI membership and interaction terms to capture differences in the impact 
of environmental disclosure on market valuation for these firms relative to others.  In no cases 
were either of the environmental disclosure metrics significantly associated with market value.  
                                                
17 We use KLD scores reported in 2010.  However, in sensitivity tests we replaced this measure with lagged scores 
from 2009.  Results, not presented here, were qualitatively similar to those using the 2010 metric. 
18 In non-tabulated sensitivity tests, we re-estimated the models using the lagged environmental performance 
measure.  We also estimated models with environmental disclosure*environmental performance interaction terms to 
allow the impact of disclosure to vary across all different environmental performance levels. All results are 
qualitatively similar to the original findings. 
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Overall, therefore, we conclude that our evidence suggests environmental disclosure, similar to 
social disclosure, does not appear to be valued by investors. 
---------- Table 6 about here ---------- 
 
Conclusion 
 Motivated by both the increased attention CSR disclosure recently has received from the 
mainstream accounting research community and that group’s failure to engage with prior CSR-
themed research, we attempt in this study to identify if the practice today differs from that of the 
1970s.  Based on samples of industrial companies included in the 1977 and 2010 Fortune 500 
listings, we find that the breadth of CSR disclosure had increased significantly.  However, our 
analysis also indicates that the relationship among legitimacy factors to differences in CSR 
disclosure remains largely unchanged over time.  Firm size continues to explain differences in 
environmental, social, and overall CSR information provision, and membership in 
environmentally sensitive industries, although less powerfully associated with differences in 
2010 than in 1977 using one of our two metrics, continues to be positively associated with 
differences in environmental disclosure.  Further, and importantly, we document that CSR 
disclosure, in apparent contrast to the arguments of the more recent mainstream investigations, is 
not positively associated with differences in firm value.   
 The findings of our investigation would appear to suggest that the failure of the new 
wave of CSR research in the mainstream accounting community to acknowledge and consider 
prior research into social and environmental accounting is potentially troublesome. Specifically, 
recent CSR disclosure research published in mainstream journals often lends credence to 
voluntary information arguments that ignore previous contradictory findings and well-
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established alternative explanations for observed empirical relationships.  Indeed, the new 
wave’s unquestioned acceptance that the disclosure is about informing investors as opposed to 
being, as argued in much of the prior CSR-themed research, a tool of legitimation and image 
enhancement makes it, we believe, less likely that such disclosure will ever move meaningfully 
toward transparent accountability.   
 Like all studies, our investigation suffers from certain limitations.  We explore changes in 
CSR disclosure only for industrial firms and as such we cannot generalize findings to companies 
in other industries.  Similarly, we focus only on companies in the United States.  Interest in 
corporate social responsibility, in general, and in CSR disclosure more particularly is argued to 
vary across regions (see, e.g., Simnett et al., 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2012), and as such, differing 
relationships may hold in other countries.  Finally, our disclosure metrics are limited by the 
availability of firm-specific information provided by Ernst & Ernst.  Richer disclosure measures 
may reveal patterns we are not able to capture.  Extensions of our analysis along any of these 
lines, therefore, would appear to be warranted.  
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Table 1 
Tests of Differences in the Breadth of CSR Disclosure 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A – Total Disclosure  
 Content Scores Mean  Std. Dev. t-stat  sig.a 
 
      1977    6.99    4.98 
      2010  14.54    6.37  13.467  .000 
 
 Weighted Scores Mean  Std. Dev. t-stat  sig. 
 
      1977    6.13    3.88 
      2010  11.98    3.98  15.186  .000 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B – Environmental Disclosure 
 Content Scores Mean  Std. Dev. t-stat  sig.a 
 
      1977    2.04    1.55 
      2010    4.92    1.90  16.890  .000 
 
 Weighted Scores Mean  Std. Dev. t-stat  sig. 
 
      1977    2.64    1.95 
      2010    4.29    1.66    9.334  .000 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C – Social Disclosure 
 Content Scores Mean  Std. Dev. t-stat  sig.a 
 
      1977    4.94    4.27 
      2010    9.61    4.98  10.285  .000 
 
 Weighted Scores Mean  Std. Dev. t-stat  sig. 
 
      1977    3.49    2.74 
      2010    7.67    2.79  15.451  .000 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Sample size is 205 firms from 1977 and 213 from 2010. 
a Significance levels are two-tailed. 
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Table 2 
Tests for Changes in Legitimacy Relationships – Total CSR Disclosure 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Content    Weighted 
     Scores       Scores 
 
     Constant    10.310        8.166 
    (12.335)***     (14.282)*** 
 
     Year      7.593        5.771 
      (6.654)***       (7.382)*** 
 
     SizeRank     -0.035       -0.024 
     (-5.505)***      (-5.580)*** 
 
     ESI       0.764        1.250 
      (1.012)       (2.415)** 
      
     Year*SizeRank     0.002        0.004 
      (0.267)       (0.730) 
 
     Year*ESI    -0.346        -0.738 
    (-0.316)      (-0.984) 
 
     n           418                    418 
 
     Adj. R2         .390         .439 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variables are the total CSR disclosure content and weighted scores, respectively. 
t-statistics in parentheses beneath parameter estimates. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, two-tailed, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Tests for Changes in Legitimacy Relations – Separate Disclosure Areas 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
         Environmental    Social 
 
   Content Weighted  Content Weighted 
    Scores    Scores   Scores   Scores 
 
     Constant     2.528      3.028    7.783      5.138 
   (10.004)***  (11.502)***  (11.375)***   (12.568)*** 
 
     Year     2.974     1.735    4.619      4.041 
     (8.608)***    (4.821)***   (4.937)***   (7.230)*** 
 
     SizeRank    -0.008    -0.008   -0.027     -0.016 
    (-4.266)***   (-4.128)***  (-5.139)***  (-5.147)*** 
 
     ESI      0.968     1.240   -0.203      0.012 
     (4.230)***    (5.200)***  (-0.328)   (0.031) 
      
     Year*SizeRank    0.001     0.002    0.002      0.002 
     (0.288)    (0.833)   (0.220)   (0.451) 
 
     Year*ESI   -0.280     -0.724   -0.066     -0.004 
   (-0.845)   (-2.099)**  (-0.073)  (-0.007) 
 
     n          418       418        418        418 
 
     Adj. R2        .483      .277       .285       .427 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variables are environmental and social disclosure content and weighted scores, respectively. 
t-statistics in parentheses beneath parameter estimates. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, two-tailed, respectively. 
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Table 4  
 Tests for Changes in Market Valuation using Total Disclosure Score 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Content    Weighted 
     Scores       Scores 
 
     Constant      -7.627       -5.808 
      -(2.553)**       (2.524)*** 
 
     Year     33.318      31.139 
      (7.502)***       (5.820)*** 
 
     Total Assets     0.531        0.527 
      (6.463)***       (6.457)*** 
 
     Total Liabilities    -0.834       -0.823 
     (-7.391)***      (-7.327)*** 
 
     EBIT      3.949        3.943 
    (13.010)***     (13.100)*** 
      
     CSR Disclosure    -0.171       -0.509 
     (-0.572)      (-1.339) 
 
     Year*CSR Disclosure    0.281        0.643 
     (0.745)       (1.215) 
 
     n          418           418 
 
     Adj. R2         .652         .653 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable is the market value of equity. 
The specific CSR disclosure metric employed in each model is indicated in the column heading. 
t-statistics in parentheses beneath parameter estimates. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, two-tailed, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Tests for Changes in Market Valuation using Separate Disclosure Areas 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
         Environmental    Social 
 
   Content Weighted  Content Weighted 
    Scores    Scores   Scores   Scores 
 
     Constant    -4.742    -4.345    -8.990    -8.413 
    (-1.669)*   (-1.504)   (-3.194)***   (-2.897)*** 
 
     Year    29.570    33.226   35.174   32.637 
     (6.334)***    (7.098)***    (8.962)***   (6.666)*** 
 
     Total Assets     0.543     0.538     0.529     0.526 
     (6.666)***    (6.613)***    (6.432)***    (6.426)*** 
 
     Total Liabilities   -0.841    -0.838    -0.830    -0.820   
    (-7.506)***   (-7.478)***   (-7.357)***    (7.290)***  
      
     EBIT     3.954     3.958     3.931      3.915 
   (13.177)***  (13.198)***  (12.897)***   (12.945)*** 
 
     Disclosure Score   -2.324          -1.872     0.070     -0.083  
    (-2.422)**   (-2.460)**    (0.201)    (-0.154) 
 
     Year*Disclosure    2.732     1.430     0.055      0.451   
     (2.214)**    (1.237)    (0.122)     (0.601) 
 
     n          418       418        418        418 
 
     Adj. R2        .657      .657       .652       .652 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable is the market value of equity. 
The specific CSR disclosure metric employed in each model is indicated in the column headings. 
t-statistics in parentheses beneath parameter estimates. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, two-tailed, respectively. 
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Table 6 
 Tests for Relationship of Environmental Disclosure to Market Valuation Controlling for 
Environmental Performance – 2010 Sample Only  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
      Content   Weighted 
      Scores      Scores 
 
     Constant       14.495      21.416 
        (3.024)***      (4.645)*** 
 
     Total Assets      0.312       0.304 
       (2.743)***      (2.678)*** 
 
     Total Liabilities     -0.512      -0.500 
      (-3.494)***     (-3.411)*** 
 
     EBIT       5.736       5.694 
      (10.502)***     (10.504)*** 
 
     Environmental Disclosure     0.582      -0.999 
      (0.700)     (-1.062) 
 
     Environmental Performance    1.264       1.762 
       (1.055)      (1.476) 
 
     n            196         196 
 
     Adj. R2          .756        .756 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable is the market value of equity. 
The specific CSR disclosure metric employed in each model is indicated in the column headings. t-
statistics in parentheses beneath parameter estimates. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, two-tailed, respectively. 
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Appendix 
Disclosure scale of CSR information items from the Ernst & Ernst (1978) survey 
 
Environment 
  1. Pollution control 
  2. Prevention or repair of damage to the environment 
  3. Conservation of natural resources 
  4. Other environmental disclosures 
 
Energy 
  5. Conservation of energy 
  6. Energy efficiency of products 
  7. Other energy-related disclosures 
 
Fair Business Practices 
  8. Employment of minorities 
  9. Advancement of minorities 
 10. Employment of women 
 11. Advancement of women 
 12. Employment of other special-interest groups 
 13. Support for minority businesses in the U.S. 
 14. Socially responsible business practices abroad 
 15. Other statements on fair business practices 
 
Human Resources 
 16. Employee health and safety 
 17. Employee training 
 18. Other human resource disclosures 
 
Community Involvement 
 19. Community activities 
 20. Health-related activities 
 21. Education and the arts 
 22. Other community activity disclosures 
 
Products 
 23. Safety 
 24. Reducing pollution arising from use of product 
 25. Other product-related disclosures 
 
 
